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1 Introduction:
In a series of contributions Parente and Prescott (1993, 1994,1999 and 2000) have argued
that growth and accumulated living standards depend on the freedom of business to
innovate and sell their innovations via free entry into business; this freedom could be
withdrawn by regulations, taxes, or a variety of government restrictions designed to
protect existing producers  barriers to richesas they term it. Over the past decade
a variety of indices have been constructed to measure this freedom. Here we use one
compiled by the World Bank on the costs of entering and exiting from business. This
index we combine with a measure of general taxation to create what we call for simplicity
a business tax rate. Our aim in this paper is to explore in a deliberately simplied model
whether the Barriers to Riches theory, which we will call Incentivism, can explain post-
war growth across the world (76 countries, 19702000, in data from the Penn Tables).
Plainly there has been a wide range of work, in the form of both history and case stud-
ies, devoted to explaining growth and the proximate factors causing it (see for example
Easterly, 2001, and Snowdon, 2007, chapter 2, for a useful survey). Parente and Prescott
themselves calibrate general equilibrium models and see whether these can replicate the
facts of relative living standards and growth episodes since 1820. They reject in par-
ticular models in which capital accumulation (including and excluding intangibles) and
education account for these when there are no barriers to the transmission of best world
available practice; the problem is that investment and education rates are too similar
across countries to generate the necessary di¤erences in performance. The model that
succeeds is one where the transmission of best practice is blocked di¤erentially across
countries by the government protection of insiders. However here we aim to carry out a
more limited and complementary study in terms of econometrics on post-war panel data
and attempt to set this Incentivist theory up in a way that is testable on this data.
Ranged up against this thesis are a variety of theories that growth depends on active
government intervention to promote particular sorts of activity: two we focus on here are
education and R&D. We will measure the extent of government intervention to promote
these by respectively government spending as a percent of GDP on all levels of education
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and the government percentage share of total country R&D spending. These theories we
will call Activism. According to Incentivism growth is triggered by people choosing to be
entrepreneurial in response to incentives; these activities could take the form of acquiring
skills via education or by doing R&D, but if so these would just be some of the forms
their activity could take but that activity would be dened by its focus on exploiting
business opportunities. According to Activism it is these latter specic activities that
generate higher productivity and therefore government can raise growth by subsidising
them.
For our tests of these theories we abandon the widely-used method of regressing,
usually in panel data, growth on a selection of exogenous growth driversand checking
whether a particular driver is statistically signicant1. We argue that this method is
awed by potential data-mining, by likely bias and by lack of identication. If one writes
down a model of endogenous growth (as we will shortly do) one nds that it is complex
and non-linear so that it does not have a linear reduced form; thus the linear reduced
formswritten down for testing are no more than guesses at the variables, either exogenous
or predetermined, that might be included among the determinants of growth. Even if
their inclusion is correct, the omitted variables will in general include powers or other
combinations of these included variables; hence the error terms will be correlated with the
regressors and there will be bias whose size and direction cannot be estimated reliably.
Partly because authors have been conscious of these problems, they have included
various menus of controlor nuisancevariables in these regressions. The trouble comes
in the criteria for choosing them as many can be suggested in the absence of a tightly
specied underlying structural model being applied. The statistical signicance of the key
variable under test will in general be much a¤ected by this choice; hence the vulnerability
of the method to data-mining.
1Leach (2003) and OECD (Leibfritz et al, 1997) provide useful surveys of this literature. Studies
include Barro (1991), Koester and Kormendi (1989), Hansson and Henrekson (1994), Cashin (1995),
Engen & Skinner (1996), Leibfritz et al (op. cit.), Alesina et al. (2002), Bleaney, Gemmell & Kneller
(2000), Folster & Henrekson (2000), Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001), Benson and Johnson (1986), Chao
and Grubel (1998), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Grier and Tullock (1989), King and Rebelo (1990),
Levine and Renelt (1992), Peden and Bradley (1989), Plosser (1992), Scully (1989, 1991, 1995), Slemrod
(1995), Smith (2001), Vedder and Gallaway (1998).
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The problem of identication arises because we do not know what model is generating
these reduced forms; many di¤erent models could give rise to some relationships between
the chosen regressors and growth. For example if the regressors are correlated (due to
transmission within the model) with the true causal mechanisms whatever they are one
could obtain signicant regression coe¢ cients on the chosen regressors which in fact come
from a quite di¤erent set of causes.
For such reasons the large literature above may not be regarded as entirely persuasive
evidence. Those for example who think R&D is the major factor determining growth
will not be impressed by regressions showing that tax rates are correlated with growth.
Vice versa with regressions highlighting R&D those favouring the tax explanation are
unwilling to be persuaded.
In this paper we take a new approach to testing, one that has been used in time-series
macroeconomics with some promising results. This approach we will term Popperian
because it is an attempt to take as far as possible the principles of rejection put forward
by Popper (1934). In these the idea is to set out the model to be tested and to use all
possible implications of it for the data to reject it. For this purpose the model must be
specied quite unambiguously and must be identied  that is it must not be able to
be confused with another model. Secondly the model must be estimated on the data
and must not be rejected at this stage. Thirdly, if there are other relationships it might
imply or be consistent with  in this context these will be growth regressions  such
regressions must be consistent with the model being true. This approach is new and
therefore we set out carefully below the steps to be followed in this paper.
We start by insisting on a clearcut null hypothesisby which we mean a hypothesis
treated as true for purposes of testing (by nullhas often strictly been meant the zero
hypothesis of no relationships at all because this is the one that is taken to be rejected in
much statistical testing; however we adopt the denition of workingor initially believed
hypothesis here because in our approach it will be this, not the zero hypothesis that is to
be rejected). This null hypothesis is the micro-founded (structural) theory of endogenous
growth in this case that we are going to test. This theory will be set up to permit three
4
variants, viz. Incentivist or Activist, and in the latter case either stressing education or
stressing R&D.
This theory being specied is then estimated on the data in its structural form. It may
be rejected at this stage, if the critical parameters cannot lie within the range required
at some statistical condence level. Here since the data we have is panel data there are
practical limitations to how far we can apply the restrictions implied by the structural
model. For example expectations of future variables cannot in practice be generated by
solving each countrys model forwards at each point of time as we would with time-series
data for one country. Instead what we do is to estimate two key structural equations;
these are the production function and the labour supply function, both necessary for our
purpose in explaining output supplied. We t these to the levels of variables in the data.
Our models specication is to variable levels, so it is appropriate to estimate it in these
terms, so that it can be tested for these implications.
The theory as constructed and estimated in this way then, assuming it cannot rejected
at this stage, can be reused to test its further implications for linear reduced formsof
interest. Here these forms are the growth regressions with which we began. We may ask
whether each model can explain the growth regressions implied by it that we observe. To
do this we note that each structural model as constructed above a) implies the exclusion
of all variables other than those it identies as causal (a zero restriction: these should
therefore not appear in the reduced form) b) together with the panel data, implies certain
errors  the structural error termsin each structural equation. These latter errors can
be regarded as the e¤ects of non-systematic factors omitted from the model that may
a¤ect output (productivity) and labour supply (leisure preference). Clearly each model
will partition the data di¤erently into the part explained by the drivers it identies as the
identied causes and the part allocated to these errors. This di¤erence of partitioning is
what distinguishes one model from another.
To explore whether a model can explain the growth regressions, we bootstrap the
random elements in the error processes together with the random elements in the exoge-
nous variables to create the sampling variation of the data as implied by the model. This
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sampling variation permits us to derive statistical condence limits for the parameters of
the growth regressions under the null hypothesis of the model. In turn this allows us to
reject the model at this last stage.
In what follows we go into the exact methods in detail but this account has, we hope,
outlined our method and the reasons for it.
2 A model of endogenous growth for a small open
economy:
We begin (essentially as in Gillman and Kejak (2005) and following the same essential
approach as Lucas (1988)) from a standard intertemporal utility function and a perfectly
competitive rm sector with a Cobb-Douglas production function, from which households
derive wages for their labour supply as workers and dividends for their capital; under con-
stant returns to scale dividends and wages add up to total GDP. We assume that each
household owns a corresponding rm for which it works (at competitive wage rates be-
cause it could always decide to work elsewhere) and also may undertake entrepreneurial
activity to innovate its methods, so raising its productivity. This is the models mecha-
nism of growth; notice that it is essentially the same as the diversion of peoples time to
education or to R&D, each of which also would raise productivity. However each house-
hold must buy its consumption and investment goods from other rms. Government taxes
both in order to make transfer payments back to households (for redistributive purposes)
and there is no government spending. The economy is open but is smallin the strictest
sense; that is, it can borrow on world markets at the world real interest rate and its goods
prices are also set on world markets. Each economy in our world of 76 countries will face
the same world market; following Parente and Prescott each country has a di¤erent level
of total factor productivity and the choices of its citizens determine how fast they raise
this, by diverting their time from normal work to productivity-enhancing activities. In
doing this they can draw on the world stock of available knowledge and borrow world
capital to implement their resulting higher productivity output.
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We go on to show that this economy for our purposes (examining its growth behaviour)
can be summarised in three equations: the production function reduced to a function of
productivity and labour supply, a labour supply function of labour/consumption taxation,
and a productivity function of the accumulated tax rate on entrepreneurial activity.
3 Derivation of the 3-equation model:
The representative households utility function seen from period 0 is:
Ut = E0
X
t=0
t(ln ct + tl lnxt) (1)
where t is a stationary preference error process,
subject to
(1 +  t)ct + kt   (1  )kt 1 + bt = yt + (1 + rt 1)bt 1 +  t   tzt (2)
where:
 is the tax rate on consumption  this is assumed to be the sole general tax (so that
dividends and wages are taxed indirectly through consumption);
 is tax levied on entrepreneurial activity;
consumption (c), capital stock (k), foreign bonds (b), leisure (x), entrepreneurial
activity (z) and government transfers ( ) are all expressed per capita;
 is depreciation and r is the real rate of interest on foreign bonds. Goods are bought
by some system of organised barter and so we ignore the role of money in this economy;
yt = Atk

tX

t (1  xt  zt)1   is the Cobb-Douglas production function of the house-
hold (and rm combined). X represents exogenous other production factors  such as
land/natural resources  assumed to be owned by households.
The households rst order conditions familiarly yield (where  are the Lagrangean
parameters):
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0 =
1
c0(1 +  0)
; 1 =

c1(1 +  1)
(from the rst derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to current and future con-
sumption)
E01[1  ] = 0[1  y0k0 ] (from the rst derivative with respect to capital, kt )
E01[1 + r0] = 0 (from the rst derivative with respect to foreign bonds, bt)
0[
(1 )y0
1 x0 z0 ] =
0l
x0
(from the rst derivative with respect to leisure).
At this stage we treat entrepreneurial activity, z, as xed. But we will return to it
once we have introduced productivity determination below.
From these conditions (letting time zero be generalised to any t) we can derive the
consumption condition:
ct =
1
(1 +  t)
Et
ct+1(1 +  t+1)
1 + rt+1
(3)
the condition relating the marginal product of capital (which we also denote by the
shadow real dividend rate, dt) to world real interest rates plus depreciation:
rt +  =
yt
kt
= dt (4)
and the condition relating labour supply to the marginal product of labour (which we
also denote by the shadow real wage,wt):
a)wt =
(1     )yt
(1  xt   zt) ; b)xt =
tlct(1 +  t)
wt
(5)
Using the marginal productivity of capital condition, we can replace capital in the
production function by terms in the shadow dividend (determined in 5).
yt = A
1
1 
t (

dt
)

1 
X

1 
t (1  xt   zt)
1  
1  (6)
What this means is that the household can obtain whatever capital it needs to produce
its desired output at a xed price on world markets; thus it is only limited in the output
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it can produce by the supply of labour o¤ered at the going shadow wage.
We now turn to the determination of productivity growth and the marginal condition
determining z.
In this model representative households choose how much to invest and work within
their available production technology. This technology is assumed here to improve
through householdsinnovation by nding out about better processes. We assume that
there is some innovative or entrepreneurial activity a household can undertake which
involves spending the time denoted as z above. In endogenous growth models one key
channel of growth is via labour being withdrawn from normalwork and being used for
an activity that raises productivity. Here we think of it as innovation, as in Klette
and Kortum (2004); in Lucasmodels (Lucas (1988)) it would be education; in models
stressing R&D, as in Aghion and Howitt (1998), it would be research activity. Notice
that in all three ways that productivity growth might be enhanced, the maximisation
issue is exactly the same: the household must divert an appropriate amount of time away
from standard work into this growth-enhancing activity. It decides how much time to
devote to z by maximising its expected welfare as above.
We write the growth of productivity as:
At+1
At
= a0 + a1zt + ut (7)
where ut is an error process, and the parameter a1 is the e¤ect of the entrepreneurial
activity on productivity growth.
Going back therefore to the households optimising decision, its rst order condition
for zt at time 0 is given by2
0 = E0
1X
t=1
a1
A0
A1
t
yt
(1 +  t)ct
  0(w0 + 0)
2This is obtained by di¤erentiating the Lagrangean above with respect to z0 remembering that (7)
determines At. Thus we obtain
0 = E0
P1
t=1 a1
A0
A1
tyt   0(w0 + 0)
Note that @yt@z0 = k

tX

t (1   xt   zt)1   @At@z0 =
yt
At
@At
@z0
(t  1); while since At = AtA1 A1A0A0 and AtA1 is
independent of z0 it follows that @At@z0 =
At
A1
A0
n
@A1A0 =@z0
o
= AtA1A0a1. Hence nally
@yt
@z0
= yt
A0
A1
a1 =
yt
a1
a0+a1z0+u0
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from which we can obtain
z0 =
n
E0
P1
t=1 
t( 1
(1+ t)
)yt
ct
o
0(w0 + 0)
  (a0 + u0)
a1
We now compare a1z0 with (7) and nd that
A1
A0
=
a1
n
E0
P1
t=1 
t( 1
(1+ t)
)yt
ct
o
0(w0 + 0)
(7a)
What this is telling us is that entrepreneurs make allowance for the productivity
growth already coming from other sources when they decide on optimal e¤ort; they
exactly o¤set these in their decision, so that it is purely entrepreneurs that determine
productivity growth. To evaluate this equation we note that our tax rates are a random
walk and that (see appendix) ct
yt
is non-stationary. We approximate the latter as a random
walk. Omitting second order (variance and covariance) terms then the numerator of (7a)
is given by 
1  (
1
(1+0)
)y0
c0
; then using (5) for w0 and substituting for 0, we obtain
A1
A0
=

a1
1  
1
(1 +  0)
y0
c0

=

1
c0(1 +  0)
(
0lc0(1 +  0)
x0
+ 0)

=

a1
1  
y0
c0
x0
0l

=

(1 +  0) + 0
x0
0lc0

(7b)
We now linearise this as
A1
A0
= 0   1( 0 + 00) + error0
where 00 = 0
x0
0lc0
is the tax on entrepreneurs normalised by the ratio of preference-
adjusted leisure to consumption; and since At+1
At
=  lnAt+1 + 1; gathering constants as
00 and letting u
0
t = errort we obtain
 lnAt+1 = 
0
0   1( t + 0t) + u0t
What we see is that the tax rate on entrepreneursconsists of both the general tax
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rate and the particular imposts levied on business activity as such. These would include
corporation tax for example if it is not rebated to the shareholder as an imputed tax
already paid on dividends. Here we pay especial attention to the levies on entry and exit
from business as measured by international bodies.
3.1 Generalising the analysis to di¤erent sorts of endogenous
productivity growth:
The analysis above treats every household as being a potential entrepreneur in its choice
of z; hence the relevant tax rate on z is the business tax,  + 0. We now introduce the
idea that di¤erent households face di¤erent opportunities for raising their productivity;
for some education may be the way while for others (no doubt typically embodied in large
rms) investment in R&D. In this way we propose to test the Activist theories that gov-
ernment subsidies to education and R&D are the essential drivers of productivity growth.
We suppose that there are proportions ; e and  of these households respectively in
the population; they add up to unity. Each type of household maximises exactly as above
with the only change being that:
1. for each the relevant special tax rate corresponding to the tax on entrepreneurship
alters to that special for its particular growth activity.
2. the total of household behaviour is obtained by adding together each of these
groups and weighting it by its proportion in the population.
Thus now
 lnAt+1 = 
0
0   ( t + 0t)  ee( t + e0t)  ( t + 0t) + u0t
where the coe¢ cients  denote the response of each household type and 0t; e
0
t; 
0
t
represent the respective tax rates (or subsidies, negative tax rates).
We may also note that when we are dealing with macro aggregates, they are all
weighted averages of these various types.
11
3.2 Completing the model:
To complete the model, we require:
(1) the government budget constraint which brings together the revenues it raises from
households and the transfer it pays over; the government too can borrow from abroad via
foreign bonds but for simplicity we assume it does not as it has no impact on the models
workings.
 tct +
X
(0tzt + e
0
tzet + 
0
tzt) =  t
where the z are subscripted by their relevant household type.
(2) goods market clearing in which households buy consumption and investment goods
(gross investment = kt+1 (1 )kt) from rms who may supply them either from their own
output or from net imports (m) purchaseable on the world market at going (exogenous)
world prices. If rms have excess output they export it onto the world market at these
prices. We set world prices at unity, ignoring terms of trade changes as an exogenous
variable with no impact on the models workings.
yt +mt = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt
It can easily be veried that the balance of payments constraint is implied (via Walras
Law) by the household and government budget constraints, the constraint that rms have
no surplus prots (all earnings are distributed via wages and dividends) and goods market
clearing.3
3Thus taking the household budget constraint
(1 +  t)ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt +  t  
P
(0tzt + e
0
tzet + 
0
tzt)
we note that the tax terms cancel with the government transfer via the governments budget constraint
so that
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt
Now we use market clearing to substitute out for yt so that
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + bt+1 = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt  mt + (1 + rt)bt:
Cancelling terms yields the balance of payments
bt+1   bt = rtbt  mt
where net lending abroad (the capital account decit) equals net interest from abroad minus net
imports (the current account surplus).
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3.3 Solution of the model:
The model is most conveniently analysed in loglinear form. We have from (3):
ln ct =   ln(1 +  t) + Et ln ct+1 + Et ln(1 +  t+1)  Et ln(1 + rt+1) + constant (8)
Here we have made use of the fact that when x is lognormally distributed lnEx =
E lnx + 0:5var lnx: We assume throughout that our errors are lognormal and have a
constant variance, so that the variance and covariance terms are included in the constant
term above. To loglinearise xt we proceed by linearising (5b) as:
xt
x
= (lc
wx
) t + (
1+ t
xt
)(tlct
wt
) which we can approximate, adding a constant of
integration, as:
lnxt = (
lc
wx
) t + ln ct   lnwt + lnt + constant (9)
Using (5a) above to substitute out wages (and assuming lnxt  ln(1 xt zt) because
leisure and working time are approximately equally divided and assuming entrepreneurial
time is very small relative to the other two) yields:
lnxt = l
 t + 0:5fln ct   ln ytg+ 0:5 lnt+ constant (10)
where l = 0:5
h
flc
wx
)
i
:
It can be shown that fln ct ln ytg is a non-stationary process (for the formal derivation
see the appendix); the reason lies in the permanent income hypothesis, that consumption
equals permanent income from home output plus interest on foreign assets. The stock
of foreign assets then follows a random walk because consumers use foreign assets as a
way of smoothing any uctuations of home income around permanent income. It follows
that we can replace this term (plus the stationary preference error) with a non-stationary
error process, which will plainly be correlated with the other errors in the model and may
also be autocorrelated.
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In order to solve the model and eliminate expected future terms it is necessary to make
assumptions about the behaviour of the exogenous variables. We assume that world real
interest rates, r, are stationary and autoregressive of order 1: rt = (1  )r+ rt 1+ t:
We assume that all the policy variables, essentially the tax rates, are random walks, which
is frequently found empirically since tax changes are generally the result of policy change
which is by construction unexpected.
A full explicit solution in terms of the forcing processes requires dynamic program-
ming. However as noted earlier we treat the log of the consumption/income ratio in (10)
as a random walk error process and include it with the error due to work preferences, also
likely to be a random walk like productivity. Thus our model for estimation becomes:
 lnAt+1 = 
0
0   ( t + 0t)  ee( t + e0t)  ( t + 0t) + u0t (7)
We integrate this into levels to become lnAt =  
Pt
i=1960f( i+0i)+ee( i+ e0i)+
( i+ 
0
i)g+ 00t+ t where t = u
0
t
1 L :We then substitute this for lnAt in equation 6,
which becomes our rst equation to be estimated
ln(1  xt) =  l t + vt (10)
where as noted above we have treated ln(1  x)    lnx
(6) in loglinearised form is now:
ln yt = (
 1
1   )
tX
i=1960
f( i + 0i) + ee( i + e0i) + ( i + 0i)g
+ ln(1  xt) + (1   ) lnXt + c+ 00t+ t + t (6)
(where we have neglected the direct e¤ect of zt on output for convenience as very small;
where  = 1  
1  and where   1  ln rt = t is the e¤ect of world real interest rates 
this is assumed to be picked up by the time e¤ects in the panel estimation process (as is
00t) while (1   ) lnXt is assumed to be picked up by the country and time e¤ects).
Thus (10) and (6) are our two equations of the model to be taken to the data.
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These equations have been chosen for tractability in the context of our panel set-up
and data set. Forward-looking terms for example must be substituted out because we are
in practice unable to solve each country model separately over the sample period. Other
variables, such as wages, we have no data for. We have substituted out consumption in
order to simplify the model to be estimated to its essentials. Thus one of our two equa-
tions (6) contains the production function which is essentially structural, an engineering
relationshipwith capital solved out in terms of its rst-order condition; productivity in
it is a function of the business or other taxes. The other equation is (10) the labour
supply equation derived from rst order conditions as partially solved out. The resulting
two error terms include what the data and model imply are the omitted e¤ects of the
exogenous errors. These e¤ects do not include the direct e¤ects of interest in the model,
of tax rates on productivity growth and on labour supply; these are explicitly included
in the model.
Thus the two equations constitute a structural modelin the sense that they jointly
exactly replicate the data country by country in a way entirely constrained by the model
and its solution method; and that they can be solved to give the paths of output and
labour supply.
3.4 Empirical work  Incentivism: the model with business
tax alone
We begin by considering a model in which business tax alone, out of the three we have
identied, is operative. Later we consider the addition of the other taxes. In this model
the production function error should be purged of all e¤ects of business taxation since
this is explicitly entered in the estimated equation. Hence the model attributes a causal
role to business taxation in creating growth.
The procedure we follow to test the model we have set out is that of bootstrapping.
The idea is that we treat the model  in the form of the two equations set out above 
as the true or nullhypothesis. We estimate this model on the available post-war annual
data, for 76 countries from 19702000. The resulting 2 structural errors for each country-
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period are thus the implied true errorsunder the model. These errors and the tax rates
have time-series properties which we assume di¤er country by country; we estimate a
time-series process for each country error and tax process, which in turn implies a set of
4 random errors (structural and tax) for each country over the period 19702000. Our
bootstrapping procedure is then to draw the whole vector of random errors as a 76-
country bloc repeatedly with replacement for a 30-year sample period (we draw them as
a vector to retain any patterns of simultaneous correlation); input them into the country
time-series processes to generate a resulting set of 30-year errors; input these in turn into
the model to generate a 30-year sample of data for the endogenous variables. Such a
30-year sample of data is one pseudo-sample. We generate 1000 of these pseudo-samples.
The idea is that these 1000 pseudo-samples represent the sampling variation that would
occur according to the model.
We then investigate whether data descriptions that would emerge from the model are
rejected by the data. We do this by estimating the descriptive form on the actual data
and also on the pseudo-samples; if the estimate generated on the actual data lie within
the 95% condence limits given by the pseudo-samples, then we say that the model is
not rejected by the data and vice versa.
The results for the model equations are as follows (with xed country and time e¤ects
on each equation). We estimate equation (6) as:
(1)
ln yt = c1 + 0:38 ln(1  xt)  0:017
Pt
i=1960( i + 
0
i)
(0:085) (0:0015)
Number of obs = 2280
F(105, 2174) = 869:93
R2 = 0:9770
R2 = 0:9759
Root MSE = 0:1605
We estimate the structural labour supply equation, (10) as:
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(3)
ln(1  xt) = c2 + 0:0128 ln(1   t)
(0:01)
Number of obs = 2280
F(103, 2024) = 278:53
R2 = 0:9308
R2 = 0:9275
Root MSE = 0:0442
The error term from this equation is a combination of labour supply preferences and
the log of the consumption/income ratio.
Notice that the business tax term in the production function has the right sign and
is highly signicant, while the general tax rate in the labour supply function also has the
right sign, though at a low level of signicance. Hence we may say that this Incentivist
theory is not rejected at the structural model level.
Bootstrapping this model as described above generates 1000 pseudo-samples. With it
we then investigate a data description for growth. In it growth depends on the (general
plus entrepreneurial) tax rate and the rate of change of the general tax rate (the latter
because growth in output not caused by productivity depends of the growth in labour
supply which in turn depends on the rate of change of the general tax rate).
3.4.1 Growth rate and taxation  descriptions of data with model-generated
95% condence bands
We now turn to our test of this above model against the growth regressions. We proceed
as follows. First we regress the data for growth on a set of potential regressors with a
view to capturing the best (linear reduced form) description of the data. We consider
four sets of regressors suggested by the theory: the level of the di¤erent special taxes; the
rate of change of personal tax,  t; country dummies; and time dummies.
In these growth regressions  t was insignicant though of the right sign. This term
picks up the temporary e¤ect on growth of the change in the personal tax rate (which
a¤ects labour supply); this e¤ect however is very poorly determined, which is perhaps not
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Table 1: Regression of Growth on Business Tax and the Rate of Change of Personal Tax
With Fixed Time and Country E¤ects
With xed country and time e¤ects
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) + 2 t Number of obs = 1748
Actual Growth regression F(100,1648) = 3:87
standard errors R2 = 0:1903
1  0:043 0:027 R2 = 0:1411
2  0:039 0:043 Root MSE = 0:0506
surprising as it works through labour supply and we know from other work that labour
supply e¤ects depend on expected tax and other variables. Here we are unable to pick
up expectations e¤ects (which could introduce a lead or a lag in the tax variable). We
therefore decided to look also at an equation with solely the business tax e¤ect whose
level should directly determine growth on a permanent basis; we would expect this e¤ect
to come through powerfully in the data description and indeed it seems to do so.
The resulting equation is:
Table 2: Regression of Growth on Business Tax With Fixed Time and Country E¤ects
With xed country and time e¤ects Number of obs = 1748
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) F(99,1649) = 3:90
Actual Growth regression R2 = 0:1899
standard errors R2 = 0:1412
1  0:050 0:026 Root MSE = 0:0506
Using panel data with xed e¤ects may not be the most e¢ cient model to run. Es-
timating the model with random e¤ects will give a more e¢ cient estimator (the reason
for this is that the estimator saves degrees of freedom by not using the xed country
dummies but instead using the regression with xed country dummies with a weight,
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to correct the regression with time dummies only). The results for the random e¤ects
estimator are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Regression of Growth on Business Tax with Random E¤ects
With random e¤ects Number of obs = 1748
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) Wald 
2(1) = 9:91
Actual Growth regression R2 within = 0:0035
standard errors R2 between = 0:0615
1  0:043 0:026 R2 overall = 0:0088
To test whether we should use the xed or random e¤ects model we run a Hausman
test, the results from this test are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Hausman Test
lnyt = 1( t + 0t)
Fixed Random Di¤erence Standard error 2(1) P-value
1  0:050  0:043  0:007 0:022 0:10 0:751
From Table 4 we nd that we can use either xed or random e¤ects in the actual
data sample without serious risk of inconsistency. However it can be seen that the xed
e¤ects regression, which we can be sure is free of inconsistency, gives e¤ects essentially
no di¤erent from the random e¤ects regression.
We now turn to the bootstrapping exercise where we wish to establish the sampling
distributions of the growth regression coe¢ cients according to our model. For this exercise
it is essential that the estimator used is consistent in all the potential data samples;
otherwise the distribution of potentially estimatedcoe¢ cients will be wrongly measured.
Hence in what follows we use the xed e¤ects estimator throughout the bootstrapping
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process, since it is known denitely to be consistent in all samples; thus each sample
estimate will give us a centralvalue for the coe¢ cients.
We now report how our chosen growth regression  with the business tax rate only 
compares with our basic model. We take the growth regression and run it on our bootstrap
data for each model. As noted earlier, this allows us to nd the 95% condence interval
implied by the model. In addition it gives the overall M-metric, that is the percentile
in the bootstrap distribution of all parameters4 jointly where the actual data regression
lies; the higher the percentile, the further into the tail the actual regression lies. As it
happens, in this case with only one parameter of interest the M-metric is directly related
to the distribution of this one parameter.
Table 5: Bootstrap Results for Model with Estimated Tax E¤ects
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) With xed country and time e¤ects
95% interval for basic model Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1  0:050  0:05680 0:0112 90:4%
What we see is that the model is accepted at the 95% level.
We also reestimated the model imposing an increased coe¢ cient on business tax and
retrieving the implied new errors. We used two cases, one in which we set the coe¢ cient
to  0:02 and another in which we set the coe¢ cient to  0:04. The results for the  0:02
case are shown in Table 6 and the  0:04 case in Table 7.
4In assessing whether the model is rejected or not we need to use the joint distribution of all the
parameters in the description. The 95% condence intervals shown by each parameter apply to that
parameter taken on its own, that is holding the other parameters as given by their estimated values. For
the model as a whole the question is whether the joint values of the estimated parameters lie within the
95% contourof the joint distribution. The idea here is that the model generates a joint distribution
of the descriptive (reduced form) parameters around the mean of the bootstrap distribution. This
is assumed to be symmetric and the Mahalanobis distance of each parameter combination from the
bootstrap mean is computed. The bootstrap distribution over this distance value  the M-metric
can be used to compute their percentile values. The model as a whole is then rejected if the actual M-
metric estimated on the data exceeds say the 95th percentile, this being the 95th percentile contour line
on the joint distribution. Clearly such a rejection is related somehow to the rejection on the parameters
individually; however, this relationship depends on the covariance matrix of these parameters which is
a crucial ingredient of the joint distribution. Thus there is no simple link from the individual rejections
to the overall rejection of the model.
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Table 6: Bootstrap Results for Model with Tax E¤ects and Coe¢ cient on Business Tax
set to -0.02
Coe¢ cient on Business Tax Set to  0:02
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) With xed country and time e¤ects
Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1  0:050  0:0580 0:0083 87:2%
Table 7: Bootstrap Results for Model with Tax E¤ects and Coe¢ cient on Business Tax
set to -0.04
Coe¢ cient on Business Tax Set to  0:04
lnyt = 1( t + 0t) With xed country and time e¤ects
Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1  0:050  0:0729  0:0034 47:5%
What is interesting about this is that there is an improvement in the models perfor-
mance vis-a-vis the data description as the models business tax e¤ect is raised. Thus if
it is raised in absolute size by two standard errors to -0.02 (from the estimated -0.017)
the M-metric falls from 90.4% to 87.2%. This parameter imposition on the production
function is not rejected by the F-test (3.06); hence we can happily accept the higher e¤ect
from both the structural and the simulation viewpoints.
The improvement in the simulation test continues from here on up. If the parameter
is raised further to -0.04 the M-metric improves to 47.5%. However of course this higher
coe¢ cient is massively outside the two standard error range on the production function
estimate; thus it fails to t the structural model quite badly (the F-test value is a massive
225). Hence the data estimation of the model itself combined with the data description
tells us that a business tax parameter of around -0.02 is the most compatible with the
data.
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3.4.2 A discussion of the empirical results on the Incentivist Model (business
tax rate alone)
We may start by discussing the conventionalway of testing the model using the standard
reduced form approach. Thus we note that the model implication  viz that the level
of business tax and the rate of change of general tax both a¤ect growth  meets a
mixed reception. The business tax e¤ect alone is fairly signicant against the usual zero
alternative; the general tax e¤ect is not. We concluded from this that the data description
should not include the general tax e¤ect as it does not contribute to explaining growth.
We might also have concluded that there was reduced form evidence of a business tax
e¤ect. However as we have argued above this is not a persuasive test for two reasons.
First, the error terms in the reduced form will include omitted nonlinear e¤ects of tax
on growth that can bias the reduced form coe¢ cient. Second, other models in which tax
plays no part could also generate this reduced form result.
So we reviewed next the evidence from the bootstrapping method, where instead of
the condence intervals generated by the reduced formwe look at those produced by
bootstrapping the structural model. We found here that the model was accepted by the
data description. In fact a model with a higher business tax coe¢ cient of -0.02 is also
accepted and with a lower M-metric by the growth regression (and still compatible with
the production function as checked by an F-test).
What is also striking is the insight a¤orded by the bootstrapping procedure into the
biases in the linear reduced form coe¢ cients under the null hypothesis. Thus we suggest
from the combination of the structural estimates and from simulating the model for a
shock to the business tax rate that growth (in steady state) increases by some 0.2% for
every 0.1 (ie 10 percentage point) fall in the business tax rate under the model. However
the reduced form coe¢ cients give a value for this business tax e¤ect that is up to two and
a half times as big. This indicates a possible bias in these linear reduced form coe¢ cients.
A further point of interest is that there is some tension between what the structural
model will tolerate in estimation and what gives the best results when simulated results
are compared with the linear reduced form. The simulated method of moments would
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give all the weight to the latter comparison; here we treat the structural estimation results
as a separate Popperian hurdle or source of potential rejection, on a par with the growth
regressions hurdle.
3.5 Adding other potential sources of growth into the model 
testing the Activist Models
From here on we expand the model to include, besides or instead of the business tax,
tax/subsidies to education and R&D. Each of these we think of as constructed of the
general tax rate and the direct tax or (usually) subsidy on this element. We measure
the subsidy to education as the share of GDP spent by government on education at all
levels; that to R&D by the government expenditure on R&D as a percentage of total
GDP. As these are subsidies they are counted as negative tax rates and referred to as
taxessymmetrically with business taxes; hence the sign of their e¤ect in our regressions
should be negative. Our procedure is the same as before except that now we replace
the (cumulant of the) business tax rate in the production function with the cumulant of
these other tax rates. As our estimate of the e¤ect of these direct tax rates we use the
freely estimated coe¢ cient on each entered on its own with the general tax rate; the only
exception is education discussed below. In the growth regressions we enter the general
tax rate and the direct tax/subsidy separately, to allow the e¤ect of the direct element
to be freely determined.
3.5.1 The Education tax/subsidy:
We obtain a nonsensical positive and signicant e¤ect of the cumulated education tax
rate in the production function when we allow it to be freely estimated, with the cu-
mulated business tax rate (and insignicant education tax e¤ect without the cumulated
business tax rate). Hence the presence of an education tax/subsidy e¤ect is rejected at
the structural level.
(a) without business tax
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ln yt = c1 + 0:792 ln(1  xt) + 0:011
Pt
i=1960  i + 0:002
Pt
i=1960 e
0
i
(0:081) (0:005) (0:032)
Number of obs = 2280
F(107, 2172) = 814:09
R2 = 0:9757
R2 = 0:9745
Root MSE = 0:1651
(b) with business tax
ln yt = c1 + 0:38 ln(1  xt)  0:019
Pt
i=1960( i + 
0
i) + 0:024
Pt
i=1960( i) + 0:055
Pt
i=1960(e
0
i)
(0:085) (0:0015) (0:0049) (0:0313)
Number of obs = 2280
F(105, 2174) = 864:07
R2 = 0:9773
R2 = 0:9761
Root MSE = 0:1596
However, for completeness we did go on to consider whether the education tax could
have a marginal e¤ect at some (imposed calibrated) level in the growth regressions test.
So our procedure was to impose on the production function the same coe¢ cient as for the
business tax rate: -0.02. The table below shows that the education tax cannot predict
any of the growth regressions, either on its own or when combined with the business tax.
The table can be understood as follows. In the rst Table we show the model with
the education tax/subsidy alone. Then the table shows the relevant growth regressions in
the actual data in the rst line of each pair, with the standard errors of the coe¢ cients in
brackets. In the second line of each pair we show the 95% condence limits of the same
coe¢ cients derived from running the same regression on the bootstrapped data from the
model; the nal column shows the M-Metric which indicates what level of condence we
would need to accept the model overall. In the second Table we show the equivalent for
the model with both education and business tax operative.
Hence we can say that any role for the education tax in the model is strongly rejected at
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Table 8: Bootstrap Results for Model With Education Tax
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(e
0
t)+country/time dummies (standard errors)
- Model has education tax alone
 t + 
0
t  t e
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0329(0.0270) 0.3934(0.1663)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0621,0.0101 -0.1873,0.1673 100%
Table 9: Bootstrap Results for Model With Education Tax and Business Tax
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(e
0
t)+country/time dummies (standard errors)
- Model has education with bus. tax
 t + 
0
t  t e
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0481(0.0105) 0.0152(0.0294) 0.3934(0.1663)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0302,0.0003 -0.0529,0.0134 -0.1490,0.1543 100%
both the structural and the growth regression levels.We therefore eliminate the education
tax/subsidy from any further consideration.
3.5.2 Government subsidy to R&D:
When we turn to the Government R&D tax/subsidy (GOVRD) we nd a di¤erent
picture. This (cumulated) is now signicant and of the right sign at the structural level.
The coe¢ cient is -0.003 with a standard error of 0.001 on its own though when entered
with the cumulated business tax it drops to insignicance. Thus at the structural level it
is rejected if we assume that the business tax rate is operating. We would only accept it
if we could reject the business tax rate in favour of the R&D model alone. We proceed
therefore to test the R&D model on its own on the growth regressions.
Table of structural equation with GOVRD on its own and with bus tax.
(a) without business tax
ln yt = c1 + 0:768 ln(1  xt) + 0:009
Pt
i=1960( i)  0:003
Pt
i=1960(
0
i)
(0:081) (0:004) (0:001)
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Number of obs = 2280
F(105, 2174) = 815:71
R2 = 0:9757
R2 = 0:9745
Root MSE = 0:1649
(b) with business tax
ln yt = c1 + 0:36 ln(1  xt)  0:019
Pt
i=1960( i + 
0
i) + 0:019
Pt
i=1960( i) + 0:0005
Pt
i=1960(
0
i)
(0:085) (0:0016) (0:0039) (0:0013)
Number of obs = 2280
F(105, 2174) = 862:9
R2 = 0:9772
R2 = 0:9761
Root MSE = 0:1597
If we now test the Government R&D Model on the growth regressions we nd that
it is rejected. The Table below shows rst the Model with the R&D tax/subsidy on its
own, and it is rejected by the growth regression. Secondly we show the Model with both
tax rates; again it is rejected by the growth regression with both.
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Table 10: Coe¢ cient on GOVRD -0.003(structural production function estimate)
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(
0
t)+country/time dummies (standard errors)
- Model has R&D tax alone
 t + 
0
t  t 
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0674(0.0270) -0.0269(0.0110)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0621,0.0002 -0.0144,0.0058 100%
Table 11: Coe¢ cient on GOVRD -0.003(structural production function estimate)
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(
0
t)+country/time dummies (standard errors)
- Model has R&D with bus. tax
 t + 
0
t  t 
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0025(0.0126) -0.0649(0.0312) -0.0269(0.0110)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0312,-0.0018 -0.0525,0.0063 -0.0113,0.0074 99.9%
These results indicate that the R&D tax/subsidy is rejected on the growth regressions
whether business tax is included in the structural model or not and also whether or not
it is included in the growth regression. However notice that in the growth regression
the negative coe¢ cient on R&D is higher in absolute value than the bootstrap range,
indicating that a structural coe¢ cient that is more negative would do better. Accordingly
we subtracted two standard errors from the -0.003 estimated and reran the bootstraps;
the results are shown in the next table.
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Table 12: Coe¢ cient on GOVRD changed to -0.005
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(
0
t)+country/time dummies (standard errors)
- Model has R&D tax alone
 t + 
0
t  t 
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0674(0.0270) -0.0269(0.0110)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0649,0.0051 -0.0171,0.0050 99.8%
Table 13: Coe¢ cient on GOVRD changed to -0.005
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(
0
t)+country/time dummies (standd errors)
- Model has R&D with bus. tax
 t + 
0
t  t 
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0025(0.0126) -0.0649(0.0312) -0.0269(0.0110)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0302,-0.0015 -0.0538,0.0078 -0.0126,0.0049 100%
What we see in this Table is that the GOVRD coe¢ cient of -0.005 still fails to match
up with the growth regression. We found that it needed to be put at -0.017 before
the structural model with R&D would be accepted (Table following). This is fourteen
standard errors above the estimated coe¢ cient and the F-test on this in the structural
equation is 122, implying massive rejection.
Table 14: Coe¢ cient on GOVRD changed to -0.017
lnyt = 0( t + 0t) + 1 t + 2(
0
t)+country/time dummies (standd errors)
- Model has R&D tax alone
 t + 
0
t  t 
0
t M-metric
Growth regression -0.0674(0.0270) -0.0269(0.0110)
Bootstrap 95% limits -0.0612,0.0071 -0.0280,-0.0081 97.8%
What this evidence is telling us is that the government share of R&D does have a
moderate e¤ect on output in the production function estimate when business tax is not
included but that this coe¢ cient cannot explain the growth regressions with this factor
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in it, with or without business tax. These growth regressions show a much larger e¤ect
of this GOVRD factor than can be explained by the only model with this factor accepted
at the structural stage, viz one with the GOVRD factor on its own. Thus this model
must be rejected. This implies that the apparent role of the GOVRD factor in the growth
regression is the result of some other causal factor than the GOVRD factor itself  i.e.
it is spurious.
Discussion of the empirical results: The theory we are investigating is in terms of
the level of output, labour supply and productivity. These levels depend on the history of
peoples diversion of e¤ort into productivity-raising activities. In the Incentivist Barriers
to Riches theory peoples incentive to do this depends on the barriers erected to it in
the form of taxes and regulations. In the Activist theory peoples incentive to acquire
education and do R&D depends on direct government encouragement of these activities.
To test the two theories on our panel data we have rst estimated a production function
whose productivity level depends on the accumulated history of these factors; also a
labour supply function of an ordinary sort from the householdsrst order condition. At
this structural stage we are mirroring Parente and Prescotts emphasis on the need for
the theory to explain the level of living standards. This rst structural-stage test is
then complemented by the test on growth regressions  the second stage. Each theory
implies that the growth regression should include only factors it identies.
Our ndings are that the model with only tax variables both ts at the structural
level and predicts the parameters of the implied growth on tax variables. Plainly growth
regressions can be done on other variables; but according to this theory any correlations
with such variables is spurious, i.e. the result of reverse or joint causation  that is,
the tax causal mechanism of growth also causes these other variablesmovement either
directly or via some link from growth to them. However this is not in this model but
in some extended model. Thus for example we nd that there is a partial correlation
between growth and GOVRD, in addition to the one with business tax. According to the
Incentivist model this is spurious.
When we turned to the Activist model focused on the government subsidy to R&D,
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we nd that it ts at the structural stage. However, the growth regression it implies
has a rather weak partial correlation with GOVRD which is inconsistent with the much
stronger one in the data. Thus this model is rejected at the second stage; by implication
the strong partial correlation with growth is spurious, in terms of the only model (the
Incentivist) that survives both test stages.
How could this partial correlation come about in practice? It may well be that when
growth is rapid it induces governments to participate directly in the process by paying for
R&D  in defence or strategic industries for example. Perhaps it sees opportunities for
more tax revenue; or the politicians involved see opportunities for personal gain. There
are many possible avenues in political economy for such processes.
Another way of looking at the matter is that the true relationship is in levels; di¤er-
ences of accumulated government GOVRD for example should show up in di¤erences in
living standards. If they do not, because there is no e¤ect, then it is nevertheless possible
for a relationship to show up in the growth rate of living standards and the levels of
government R&D, should there be some process that causes growth to a¤ect the latter.
Of course this has nothing to do with the model. This echoes the point emphasised by
Parente and Prescott that a theory must explain the di¤erence of living standards as well
as the di¤erence of growth rates. Our double-stage test should check out this capacity of
the theory. Where a theory fails, it should reveal the existence of a spurious relationship
coming from outside the causal model driving growth and living standards.
4 Conclusions
We have argued that regressions of growth on its supposed causes are not on their own
persuasive evidence of these causes. Instead we proposed to test theories by a two-stage
Popperian procedure in which rejection can occur at each stage. In the rst stage the
model as tightly specied must pass an estimation test in its structural form; in the
second its bootstrapped implications must be consistent with the growth regressions it
implies. We tested two main classes of growth theory: one was the Incentivist theory set
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out by Parente and Prescott in Barriers to Riches, the other was the Activist theory that
direct government intervention to stimulate particular activities  specically education
and R&D  caused growth. We were able to reject the latter for education at both the
structural and the bootstrap levels; and for R&D at the bootstrap level, though not the
structural. We accepted the Incentivist theory at both levels.
We suggest that these methods of testing are a useful way to proceed when there are
many competing theories which are hard to distinguish in their reduced form. Further
work would be interesting, for example both to test other theories of growth and to
consider di¤erent measures of the relevant tax incentives. Finally we emphasise, as we
began, that this sort of econometric testing can only complement and not replace the wide-
ranging investigation of the historical evolution and particular case-studies of growth in
terms of other methods.
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5 Appendix A: the non-stationarity of {ln ct   ln ytg
Start with the household budget constraint after substituting out tax and transfer terms
via the government budget constraint and wage and dividends from the rms rst order
conditions; this is line 4 of footnote 3:
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt (A1)
In expectational form the households consumption plan must satisfy this constraint
as follows after an innite forward recursion in the value of future bonds:
(1 + rt)bt = ct   y0t + Et
1X
i=0
(
iY
j=1
(1 + rt+j
) 1
(ct+i   y0t+i) (A2)
where y0t = yt   [kt+1   (1  )kt]
Now note that from the households rst order condition
Et
(
iY
j=1
(1 + rt+j
) 1
ct+i = 
ictsince for example ct =
1

Et
ct+1
1 + rt+1
=
1
2
Et
ct+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
(A3)
It follows that
ct = (1  )
8<:(1 + rt)bt + y0t + Et
1X
i=0
(
iY
j=1
(1 + rt+j
) 1
y0t+i)
9=; (A4)
The term inside the braces is the households spendable wealth hence the whole RHS
expression is permanent net income or
ct = :(1  )(1 + rt)bt + y0t (A5)
In steady state (at T ) we have (where g is the growth rate)
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cT = (1  )
(
(1 + r)bT +
1X
i=0

1 + g
1 + r
i
[1 +

r + c
]yT
)
= (1  )(1 + r)

bT +
1
r   g [1 +

r + c
]yT

= (1  )(1 + r)bT + y0T (A6)
in which all of cT ; bT ; yT will be growing at g.
Now consider the movement of ct
yt
which from A5) is:
ct
yt
= :(1  )(1 + rt) bt
yt
+
y0t
yt
(A7)
Hence using the approximation that ln(x+ y) = x
x+y
lnx+ y
x+y
ln y
ln ct   ln yt = :(share of net income from abroad) ln bt
yt
+ ln
y0t
yt
(A8)
From the balance of payments (footnote 3)
bt+1
yt+1
yt+1
yt
  bt
yt
= rt
bt
yt
  mt
yt
(A9)
or
bt+1
yt+1
  bt
yt
= (rt   gt) bt
yt
  mt
yt
We know that in steady state bt
yt
will tend to some steady level because of household
behaviour. However until this has occurred it is driven by a di¤erence equation of the
form:
xt+1 = (1 + qt)xt + t (A10)
where qt = rt gt will vary from positive to negative and t =  mtyt will move randomly
between steady states. Plainly xt = btyt .will for at least some of the periods between steady
states will be a randomly disturbed explosive (or unit root) di¤erence equation and will
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therefore be non-stationary (in other words it will end up at a new steady state randomly
di¤erent from its initial value). So therefore will ln ct   ln yt which contains its log.
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6 Appendix B: Data Description
dlny General tax Business tax Education tax Infra tax R&D tax Labour supplyCountry 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s
argentina 0.012 -0.029 0.037 0.140 0.142 0.143 0.258 0.260 0.261 -0.019 -0.017 -0.035 -0.065 -0.070 -0.074 -0.812 -0.388 -0.339 0.385 0.378 0.388
australia 0.015 0.020 0.022 0.201 0.240 0.247 0.237 0.275 0.282 -0.052 -0.051 -0.050 -0.087 -0.094 -0.100 -0.773 -0.703 -0.933 0.446 0.476 0.504
austria 0.036 0.022 0.019 0.322 0.382 0.398 0.406 0.466 0.482 -0.054 -0.056 -0.056 -0.070 -0.078 -0.087 -0.352 -0.613 -0.739 0.435 0.455 0.465
belgium 0.029 0.021 0.017 0.435 0.521 0.476 0.488 0.575 0.530 -0.063 -0.056 -0.041 -0.074 -0.079 -0.089 -0.454 -0.540 -0.535 0.388 0.403 0.411
bolivia 0.026 -0.026 0.012 0.137 0.137 0.212 0.808 0.809 0.884 -0.040 -0.026 -0.041 -0.046 -0.051 -0.054 -0.500 -0.680 -1.400 0.376 0.386 0.401
botswa 0.108 0.049 0.038 0.266 0.310 0.351 0.369 0.412 0.454 -0.052 -0.054 -0.078 -0.003 -0.016 -0.026 -0.150 -0.195 -0.200 0.442 0.436 0.440
brazil 0.056 0.010 0.005 0.235 0.248 0.294 0.304 0.317 0.363 -0.030 -0.030 -0.039 -0.059 -0.070 -0.076 -0.272 -0.380 -0.571 0.373 0.415 0.454
burki faso 0.019 0.007 0.012 0.097 0.122 0.164 0.660 0.685 0.726 -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 0.011 0.001 -0.003 -0.132 -0.132 -0.133 0.562 0.533 0.506
burundi -0.004 0.000 -0.019 0.212 0.252 0.285 0.945 0.986 1.018 -0.034 -0.031 -0.040 0.024 0.017 0.010 -0.070 -0.110 -0.150 0.553 0.544 0.536
cameroon 0.042 0.006 -0.022 0.167 0.203 0.162 0.869 0.905 0.864 -0.033 -0.030 -0.028 -0.024 -0.031 -0.027 -0.500 -0.600 -0.600 0.437 0.411 0.404
canada 0.033 0.018 0.013 0.198 0.237 0.248 0.215 0.255 0.265 -0.075 -0.066 -0.064 -0.096 -0.099 -0.099 -0.566 -0.553 -0.539 0.451 0.511 0.532
chad 0.049 -0.050 -0.015 0.118 0.186 0.250 1.589 1.656 1.721 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.150 -0.195 -0.200 0.500 0.492 0.483
chile 0.010 0.014 0.045 0.343 0.284 0.213 0.441 0.382 0.311 -0.042 -0.040 -0.031 -0.050 -0.055 -0.071 -0.333 -0.298 -0.495 0.328 0.360 0.394
colombia 0.033 0.013 0.011 0.120 0.143 0.146 0.219 0.242 0.245 -0.021 -0.026 -0.030 -0.059 -0.065 -0.071 -0.083 -0.082 -0.084 0.317 0.363 0.416
congo rep 0.049 0.044 -0.026 0.340 0.395 0.351 1.584 1.639 1.595 -0.062 -0.054 -0.059 -0.024 -0.032 -0.034 -0.280 -0.089 -0.007 0.427 0.420 0.415
costa rica 0.031 -0.012 0.018 0.202 0.237 0.220 0.355 0.390 0.373 -0.064 -0.051 -0.043 -0.054 -0.058 -0.066 -0.197 -0.192 -0.119 0.327 0.362 0.388
cote divoire 0.027 -0.031 -0.012 0.312 0.273 0.249 0.843 0.803 0.779 -0.061 -0.068 -0.054 -0.007 -0.014 -0.011 -0.057 -0.110 -0.022 0.410 0.390 0.390
denmark 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.324 0.397 0.396 0.352 0.425 0.424 -0.071 -0.070 -0.077 -0.083 -0.088 -0.093 -0.530 -0.630 -0.725 0.507 0.546 0.562
dominica 0.036 0.016 0.040 0.170 0.145 0.151 0.287 0.262 0.268 -0.024 -0.017 -0.018 -0.040 -0.043 -0.038 -0.100 -0.150 -0.171 0.354 0.384 0.419
egypt 0.011 0.035 0.027 0.521 0.438 0.331 0.804 0.722 0.614 -0.050 -0.052 -0.045 -0.037 -0.048 -0.056 -0.653 -0.220 -0.197 0.351 0.350 0.362
el salvador 0.014 -0.028 0.022 0.118 0.143 0.158 0.594 0.619 0.634 -0.032 -0.029 -0.022 -0.037 -0.042 -0.056 -0.954 -1.144 -1.009 0.334 0.355 0.402
ethiopia 0.005 -0.012 0.004 0.223 0.236 0.176 0.522 0.535 0.475 -0.026 -0.031 -0.039 -0.011 -0.015 -0.019 -0.020 -0.050 -0.053 0.457 0.447 0.438
fiji 0.036 0.000 0.014 0.239 0.272 0.284 0.460 0.493 0.505 -0.045 -0.056 -0.055 -0.037 -0.040 -0.047 -0.200 -0.218 -0.238 0.308 0.332 0.371
finland 0.029 0.032 0.010 0.259 0.294 0.379 0.267 0.302 0.386 -0.058 -0.052 -0.070 -0.082 -0.090 -0.095 -0.444 -0.617 -1.069 0.491 0.509 0.510
france 0.030 0.020 0.011 0.341 0.423 0.453 0.373 0.454 0.485 -0.049 -0.054 -0.058 -0.081 -0.090 -0.097 -0.998 -1.099 -1.076 0.434 0.439 0.444
germany 0.028 0.019 0.016 0.237 0.267 0.322 0.286 0.315 0.370 -0.043 -0.043 -0.046 -0.080 -0.086 -0.095 -1.035 -0.985 -0.884 0.467 0.489 0.501
ghana -0.002 -0.006 0.005 0.184 0.119 0.197 0.553 0.488 0.566 -0.048 -0.027 -0.041 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.900 -0.800 -0.935 0.470 0.471 0.469
greece 0.039 0.002 0.016 0.265 0.398 0.340 0.417 0.549 0.491 -0.018 -0.021 -0.027 -0.073 -0.081 -0.086 -0.144 -0.190 -0.227 0.389 0.400 0.422
guatemala 0.029 -0.009 0.008 0.103 0.129 0.115 0.386 0.412 0.398 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.027 -0.027 -0.038 -0.100 -0.191 -0.080 0.344 0.344 0.355
india 0.003 0.039 0.039 0.108 0.147 0.155 0.309 0.348 0.356 -0.026 -0.031 -0.032 -0.028 -0.038 -0.046 -0.407 -0.658 -0.606 0.437 0.431 0.432
indonesia 0.053 0.042 0.027 0.180 0.209 0.172 0.701 0.730 0.692 -0.024 -0.014 -0.013 -0.023 -0.040 -0.054 -0.352 -0.294 -0.103 0.387 0.415 0.460
iran -0.006 -0.029 0.042 0.428 0.258 0.232 0.481 0.312 0.286 -0.079 -0.044 -0.044 -0.047 -0.052 -0.064 -0.325 -0.278 -0.351 0.304 0.295 0.298
ireland 0.033 0.027 0.062 0.352 0.459 0.365 0.416 0.523 0.429 -0.054 -0.056 -0.049 -0.072 -0.078 -0.091 -0.414 -0.425 -0.743 0.375 0.372 0.396
israel 0.027 0.016 0.023 0.653 0.687 0.466 0.753 0.787 0.566 -0.069 -0.074 -0.072 -0.071 -0.076 -0.083 -1.094 -1.494 -0.936 0.371 0.383 0.413
italy 0.030 0.026 0.013 0.330 0.455 0.479 0.449 0.574 0.599 -0.041 -0.047 -0.044 -0.077 -0.082 -0.090 -0.397 -0.516 -0.747 0.396 0.413 0.439
jamaica -0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.337 0.367 0.295 0.454 0.484 0.412 -0.055 -0.057 -0.052 -0.058 -0.059 -0.068 -0.085 -0.053 -0.040 0.416 0.468 0.508
japan 0.032 0.032 0.013 0.145 0.173 0.231 0.196 0.224 0.282 -0.052 -0.051 -0.036 -0.086 -0.092 -0.098 -0.510 -0.595 -0.537 0.500 0.503 0.530
jordan 0.058 -0.002 0.006 0.392 0.358 0.325 0.602 0.568 0.535 -0.045 -0.051 -0.071 -0.041 -0.061 -0.062 -0.237 -0.216 -0.220 0.256 0.250 0.281
kenya 0.049 0.005 -0.005 0.213 0.264 0.277 0.462 0.514 0.527 -0.061 -0.061 -0.065 -0.025 -0.029 -0.034 -0.633 -0.495 -0.450 0.479 0.474 0.496
korea rep 0.066 0.060 0.048 0.157 0.164 0.167 0.233 0.240 0.243 -0.029 -0.038 -0.038 -0.052 -0.068 -0.088 -0.287 -0.317 -0.385 0.382 0.430 0.485
lesotho 0.053 0.001 0.004 0.291 0.480 0.486 0.523 0.713 0.719 -0.062 -0.071 -0.099 0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.053 -0.080 -0.088 0.428 0.412 0.406
malawi 0.047 -0.011 0.027 0.241 0.308 0.257 0.762 0.829 0.778 -0.030 -0.031 -0.044 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.211 -0.260 -0.300 0.513 0.498 0.486
malaysia 0.051 0.028 0.043 0.241 0.306 0.240 0.392 0.457 0.391 -0.053 -0.061 -0.048 -0.055 -0.069 -0.081 -0.017 -0.065 -0.108 0.364 0.388 0.400
mali 0.028 -0.021 0.016 0.100 0.263 0.396 0.819 0.982 1.115 -0.029 -0.031 -0.027 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.012 -0.015 0.522 0.509 0.494
mexico 0.031 -0.002 0.011 0.142 0.232 0.155 0.264 0.354 0.276 -0.036 -0.039 -0.049 -0.059 -0.069 -0.074 -0.176 -0.214 -0.188 0.311 0.345 0.389
morocco 0.030 0.017 0.008 0.308 0.318 0.312 0.414 0.424 0.418 -0.050 -0.062 -0.052 -0.036 -0.040 -0.053 -0.111 -0.150 -0.110 0.346 0.366 0.385
nepal 0.014 0.015 0.026 0.106 0.174 0.169 0.393 0.461 0.456 -0.014 -0.023 -0.029 -0.006 -0.018 -0.029 -0.050 -0.080 -0.044 0.500 0.476 0.463
netherlands 0.022 0.016 0.023 0.437 0.533 0.484 0.487 0.583 0.534 -0.075 -0.066 -0.051 -0.080 -0.085 -0.093 -0.968 -0.942 -0.893 0.384 0.427 0.465
newzealand 0.004 0.014 0.012 0.325 0.414 0.357 0.340 0.429 0.371 -0.054 -0.053 -0.068 -0.089 -0.092 -0.098 -0.635 -0.619 -0.632 0.407 0.451 0.491
nicaragua -0.022 -0.040 -0.030 0.164 0.489 0.376 0.787 1.112 1.000 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.036 -0.031 -0.027 -0.116 -0.208 -0.266 0.332 0.350 0.381
norway 0.040 0.023 0.028 0.321 0.361 0.396 0.335 0.375 0.410 -0.060 -0.063 -0.076 -0.093 -0.101 -0.106 -0.861 -0.744 -0.779 0.445 0.487 0.511
pakistan 0.015 0.047 0.013 0.171 0.207 0.230 0.311 0.347 0.370 -0.020 -0.024 -0.027 -0.029 -0.039 -0.048 -0.148 -0.791 -0.884 0.350 0.355 0.363
panama 0.020 0.008 0.019 0.308 0.295 0.257 0.529 0.516 0.478 -0.053 -0.045 -0.048 -0.056 -0.056 -0.061 -0.072 -0.072 -0.030 0.343 0.367 0.404
p/n guinea 0.019 -0.009 -0.004 0.327 0.324 0.303 0.567 0.565 0.543 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.026 -0.032 -0.033 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 0.505 0.491 0.490
paraguay 0.045 0.011 0.001 0.113 0.097 0.113 0.692 0.677 0.693 -0.017 -0.015 -0.032 -0.030 -0.040 -0.045 -0.100 -0.055 -0.090 0.359 0.366 0.368
peru 0.003 -0.023 0.016 0.160 0.177 0.184 0.315 0.333 0.339 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032 -0.047 -0.052 -0.054 -0.184 -0.101 -0.374 0.307 0.325 0.356
philippines 0.031 -0.006 0.011 0.139 0.137 0.190 0.340 0.338 0.391 -0.021 -0.020 -0.030 -0.046 -0.048 -0.053 -0.065 -0.040 -0.019 0.382 0.396 0.410
portugal 0.036 0.030 0.027 0.293 0.359 0.403 0.368 0.434 0.478 -0.031 -0.037 -0.052 -0.066 -0.070 -0.082 -0.212 -0.241 -0.390 0.432 0.479 0.498
romania 0.063 0.040 -0.021 0.481 0.375 0.336 0.535 0.429 0.390 -0.034 -0.025 -0.036 -0.052 -0.061 -0.060 -0.276 -0.220 -0.363 0.517 0.477 0.468
senegal -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.188 0.291 0.390 0.611 0.714 0.813 -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 -0.020 -0.022 -0.025 -0.024 -0.014 -0.004 0.467 0.453 0.446
singapore 0.075 0.048 0.058 0.181 0.251 0.187 0.189 0.259 0.195 -0.032 -0.038 -0.033 -0.072 -0.084 -0.092 -0.071 -0.250 -0.357 0.407 0.485 0.506
south africa 0.012 0.003 -0.005 0.226 0.276 0.310 0.321 0.371 0.405 -0.055 -0.054 -0.062 -0.065 -0.070 -0.074 -0.300 -0.300 -0.301 0.374 0.380 0.391
spain 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.205 0.300 0.344 0.291 0.386 0.429 -0.018 -0.030 -0.045 -0.078 -0.084 -0.091 -0.134 -0.272 -0.451 0.375 0.389 0.424
sri lanka 0.013 0.031 0.027 0.278 0.325 0.271 0.379 0.425 0.371 -0.030 -0.026 -0.032 -0.015 -0.027 -0.038 -0.064 -0.140 -0.151 0.358 0.383 0.417
sweden 0.015 0.021 0.011 0.306 0.409 0.437 0.336 0.440 0.467 -0.073 -0.076 -0.076 -0.090 -0.097 -0.100 -0.697 -1.056 -1.144 0.486 0.522 0.541
switzerland 0.005 0.017 0.002 0.169 0.203 0.262 0.213 0.247 0.306 -0.048 -0.050 -0.055 -0.088 -0.093 -0.098 -0.432 -0.504 -0.678 0.476 0.505 0.534
syria 0.054 0.009 0.032 0.393 0.343 0.238 0.540 0.491 0.385 -0.041 -0.052 -0.033 -0.037 -0.045 -0.050 -0.050 -0.062 -0.097 0.286 0.282 0.296
thailand 0.042 0.050 0.039 0.156 0.184 0.176 0.313 0.340 0.332 -0.034 -0.036 -0.042 -0.036 -0.049 -0.066 -0.286 -0.204 -0.094 0.503 0.543 0.588
tunisia 0.053 0.015 0.033 0.285 0.357 0.327 0.351 0.424 0.393 -0.054 -0.055 -0.065 -0.041 -0.051 -0.057 -0.189 -0.188 -0.188 0.321 0.347 0.371
turkey 0.026 0.016 0.019 0.181 0.188 0.256 0.302 0.308 0.377 -0.021 -0.019 -0.024 -0.046 -0.053 -0.069 -0.420 -0.259 -0.266 0.438 0.427 0.455
uk 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.356 0.385 0.398 0.380 0.409 0.423 -0.062 -0.051 -0.050 -0.088 -0.093 -0.099 -1.061 -0.960 -0.669 0.469 0.487 0.498
u.s.a. 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.198 0.227 0.217 0.228 0.257 0.247 -0.071 -0.059 -0.051 -0.109 -0.113 -0.117 -1.286 -1.215 -1.060 0.455 0.493 0.507
uruguay 0.023 -0.003 0.029 0.235 0.252 0.289 0.432 0.449 0.486 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.053 -0.057 -0.062 -0.200 -0.154 -0.200 0.396 0.416 0.448
venezuela -0.023 -0.022 -0.005 0.191 0.211 0.195 0.376 0.396 0.380 -0.045 -0.050 -0.046 -0.065 -0.074 -0.074 -0.426 -0.327 -0.403 0.320 0.356 0.388
zambia -0.004 -0.016 -0.018 0.331 0.343 0.334 0.439 0.450 0.442 -0.054 -0.039 -0.022 -0.042 -0.038 -0.035 -0.244 -0.180 -0.150 0.436 0.414 0.415
zimbabwe 0.014 0.017 -0.006 0.229 0.290 0.319 1.358 1.419 1.449 -0.033 -0.062 -0.085 -0.046 -0.045 -0.047 -0.100 -0.120 -0.150 0.451 0.456 0.463
Data definitions and sources:
1. y is GDP per capita from the Penn World Table;
2. General tax is public spending–to–GDP rate, from the Penn World Table;
3. Business tax is general tax plus marginal costs levied by the country on  firm closure & firm set-up, from the World Bank
Database;
4. Education tax is the negative value of government spending on education (primary, secondary, and tertiary) as the share of total
GDP, from the World Bank Database;
5. Infrastructure tax is the negative indexed value of government spending on infrastructure (airports, electricity, telephones, roads)
as the share of total GDP, from the World Bank Database;
6. R&D tax is negative value of the government expenditure on R&D as the percentage of total GDP, from UNESCO yearbook;
7. Labour supply is workforce as the share of total population, from the World Bank Database.
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